By Neysa Pranger, Director of Public Affairs, RPA
Albany works in strange ways. Never more evident than the debate that has emerged this legislative season over a transit finance package proposed by former MTA Chairman (and RPA Board member) Richard Ravitch to stave off massive MTA fare hikes and service cuts, and provide a long-term source of funding for the agency's rebuilding program. Why the fuss? Because everyone's favorite lightning rod issue - bridge tolls - is on the table.
By the time you read this essay, the State Senate Democratic conference will have proposed a plan that effectively kills the central theorem of the Ravitch Commission's equitable proposal to bail out the transit system and provide a long-term source of funding for transit repairs through a combination of a payroll tax, East River and Harlem River bridge tolls and modest fare increase. The Senate Democrat plan is likely to include no tolls, a smaller fare increase and a smaller payroll tax, which together will cover short-term operating needs only, while ignoring the long-term needs of fixing and rebuilding the system.
Just a few weeks ago, sentiment on passing a plan similar to what Ravitch originally proposed was high when Assembly Democrats signed off on it, albeit with $2 instead of $5 tolls. Senate Democrats, however, were not able to come to an agreement, despite statements from the Senate Majority Leader's office acknowledging the urgency of the issue. Meanwhile, Gov. David A. Paterson has publicly said he supports tolls and the Ravitch Commission Plan.
One might ask how the legislature got to this point in the process - an eerie, Groundhog-Day-like repeat of congestion pricing, but with the other house of the legislature now on the other side. (For those that might have forgotten, it was the Assembly last year that refused to hold a vote on congestion pricing, effectively killing the proposal.)
The simple answer is that Senate Majority Leader Malcolm Smith knew he did not have the votes to pass the $2 toll version of the plan proposed by the Assembly, and he stalled. Little by little, members peeled off in opposition to tolls. First it was the old "gang of three" - the same group of Democratic Senators that nearly derailed Malcolm Smith's election as Senate Majority Leader. This group, now dubbed the "three amigos" - Sens. Carl Kruger, Pedro Espada, Jr., and Ruben Diaz, Sr. - said no bridge tolls, no way, and gradually led a few more into their midst upsetting the Democratic majority power (the Senate Democrats have a razor-thin two-vote majority).
The more complex and perhaps related answer is that the Senate did not take kindly to being upstaged by the welcome reception to Assembly Speaker Silver's proposal for $2 tolls, especially since Smith desperately needed to show strength given his difficult rise to his position and the need to pass a critical first test of showing that he had firm control of his conference. Since Smith found himself in a situation where he was reacting to another's proposal, he came up with his own plan instead.
There were ways around the defection of a few Senate Democratic representatives that involved the possibility of bringing a handful of Senate Republicans on board. Senate Minority Leader Dean Skelos could have released some of his members to vote with the Democrats, including those who have a lot to gain from a well funded MTA operating and capital budgets (those with heavy transit-riding constituencies, and/or those with MTA train-, bus- and track-manufacturing facilities in their districts). Another option would have been to work out a deal with upstate Republican lawmakers to increase funding for the road and bridge program; that program has traditionally been decided at the same time at the state's transit funding package. Yet another option would have involved cutting a deal with Republicans to provide additional staffing for members, a benefit that was stripped away when the Republicans lost their majority.
Over the course of the next few days there will be much debate about where to go from here. Ever since the MTA passed its own budget back in December, the agency has maintained that it needs to know by March 25 if it should pull back on its already-approved fare hike and service reduction package. But the MTA also needs a funding source for its upcoming capital program - a critical issue that will only worsen as the year goes on. Further complicating matters with delaying capital-plan support is that Albany rarely passes new taxes or funding sources in election years, like next year. That means that the capital program and all its progress to date could come to a standstill, along with the jobs and economic stimulus it provides.
The plan by the Senate Democrats barely covers the MTA's operating budget, and it fails to address the MTA's long-term capital needs, which is the more critical component of the funding puzzle. After all, it was the lack of funding of past capital programs, and the necessity for the MTA to borrow against future fares to pay for things like new rail cars and buses and renovated stations, that led to the current $1.2 billion operating crisis.
Albany works in strange ways. Never more evident than the debate that has emerged this legislative season over a transit finance package proposed by former MTA Chairman (and RPA Board member) Richard Ravitch to stave off massive MTA fare hikes and service cuts, and provide a long-term source of funding for the agency's rebuilding program. Why the fuss? Because everyone's favorite lightning rod issue - bridge tolls - is on the table.
By the time you read this essay, the State Senate Democratic conference will have proposed a plan that effectively kills the central theorem of the Ravitch Commission's equitable proposal to bail out the transit system and provide a long-term source of funding for transit repairs through a combination of a payroll tax, East River and Harlem River bridge tolls and modest fare increase. The Senate Democrat plan is likely to include no tolls, a smaller fare increase and a smaller payroll tax, which together will cover short-term operating needs only, while ignoring the long-term needs of fixing and rebuilding the system.
Just a few weeks ago, sentiment on passing a plan similar to what Ravitch originally proposed was high when Assembly Democrats signed off on it, albeit with $2 instead of $5 tolls. Senate Democrats, however, were not able to come to an agreement, despite statements from the Senate Majority Leader's office acknowledging the urgency of the issue. Meanwhile, Gov. David A. Paterson has publicly said he supports tolls and the Ravitch Commission Plan.
One might ask how the legislature got to this point in the process - an eerie, Groundhog-Day-like repeat of congestion pricing, but with the other house of the legislature now on the other side. (For those that might have forgotten, it was the Assembly last year that refused to hold a vote on congestion pricing, effectively killing the proposal.)
The simple answer is that Senate Majority Leader Malcolm Smith knew he did not have the votes to pass the $2 toll version of the plan proposed by the Assembly, and he stalled. Little by little, members peeled off in opposition to tolls. First it was the old "gang of three" - the same group of Democratic Senators that nearly derailed Malcolm Smith's election as Senate Majority Leader. This group, now dubbed the "three amigos" - Sens. Carl Kruger, Pedro Espada, Jr., and Ruben Diaz, Sr. - said no bridge tolls, no way, and gradually led a few more into their midst upsetting the Democratic majority power (the Senate Democrats have a razor-thin two-vote majority).
The more complex and perhaps related answer is that the Senate did not take kindly to being upstaged by the welcome reception to Assembly Speaker Silver's proposal for $2 tolls, especially since Smith desperately needed to show strength given his difficult rise to his position and the need to pass a critical first test of showing that he had firm control of his conference. Since Smith found himself in a situation where he was reacting to another's proposal, he came up with his own plan instead.
There were ways around the defection of a few Senate Democratic representatives that involved the possibility of bringing a handful of Senate Republicans on board. Senate Minority Leader Dean Skelos could have released some of his members to vote with the Democrats, including those who have a lot to gain from a well funded MTA operating and capital budgets (those with heavy transit-riding constituencies, and/or those with MTA train-, bus- and track-manufacturing facilities in their districts). Another option would have been to work out a deal with upstate Republican lawmakers to increase funding for the road and bridge program; that program has traditionally been decided at the same time at the state's transit funding package. Yet another option would have involved cutting a deal with Republicans to provide additional staffing for members, a benefit that was stripped away when the Republicans lost their majority.
Over the course of the next few days there will be much debate about where to go from here. Ever since the MTA passed its own budget back in December, the agency has maintained that it needs to know by March 25 if it should pull back on its already-approved fare hike and service reduction package. But the MTA also needs a funding source for its upcoming capital program - a critical issue that will only worsen as the year goes on. Further complicating matters with delaying capital-plan support is that Albany rarely passes new taxes or funding sources in election years, like next year. That means that the capital program and all its progress to date could come to a standstill, along with the jobs and economic stimulus it provides.
The plan by the Senate Democrats barely covers the MTA's operating budget, and it fails to address the MTA's long-term capital needs, which is the more critical component of the funding puzzle. After all, it was the lack of funding of past capital programs, and the necessity for the MTA to borrow against future fares to pay for things like new rail cars and buses and renovated stations, that led to the current $1.2 billion operating crisis.
@RegionalPlan