by Petra Todorovich, Associate Planner, RPA
This essay is the last in a series of background pieces prepared for the 15th Annual Regional Assembly, to be held on Friday, April 29 at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City. The Assembly, "Beyond Red and Blue: The Tri-State Region in a Changing National Context," will focus on the Tri-State Region's relationship with the nation in the wake of the 2004 presidential elections. To register for the event click or to see a full program, visit: http://www.rpa.org.
The subject of counter-terrorism and security is so broad and so challenging that it overwhelms both the funding available and the scope of imagination to conceive of and try to prevent every possible attack. There are three areas, however, that have received attention in the New York Region for their shortcomings or vulnerabilities in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11: how federal funding is allocated to high risk areas like the New York Region; how to secure marine ports - particularly the Port of New York and New Jersey; and how to secure public spaces and city streets.
Though these three subjects comprise both policy and place-based strategies, the common theme is the immensity of the need or risk, and the limited supply or scope of resources to satisfy the need or counter the threat. Thus, federal policy makers and local leaders are required to make choices about where to allocate resources. The choices that are made define our current counter-terrorism and security strategy.
At the National Level: Funding Formulas
In his first public address last month at George Washington University, new Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff offered a peek into the department's thinking about where to focus the nation's limited resources. Chertoff signaled that he will employ a risk-based approach and measured strategy, recognizing that the war against terrorism "is a marathon, not a sprint," and must be integrated into our daily lives. His challenge will be to guide an agency that was created in response to the 9/11 attacks to one that can function over many years, separating catastrophic threats from minor ones and providing guidance to the American public on where to focus their vigilance.
National policy is already moving in this direction. After 9/11, Congress dramatically increased spending on grants to state and local governments for "first responder" programs that prepared fire fighters, police and emergency workers with training and equipment. Almost half of these initial grants were distributed evenly across the nation, however, with little attention paid to level of risk. Each state received .75% of the total amount of homeland security grants as a starting point. As a result, states like Montana and Alaska received the greatest funding per capita and states like New York and California received the least. These formulas were rightly criticized for wasting limited dollars protecting rural towns with low risk, while leaving New York City to spend its own funding on increased security and counter-terrorism efforts. In the federal budget for Fiscal Year 2006 the formulas have been changed, reducing the minimum distribution to each state from .75% of total grants to .25%. Additional grants will be awarded on the basis of risk, benefiting larger cities like New York City, and conforming with Chertoff's risk-based philosophy.
At the Regional Level : Marine Ports:
Public agencies of the region like the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey have the responsibility of protecting the region's airports, marine ports, bridges, tunnels, commuter trains, subway lines and stations. These agencies are eligible for supplemental grants through the states from the Department of Homeland Security and they rely on federal directives for policy guidance. Yet the agencies also have a degree of autonomy to create their own strategies. The Port Authority, whose history is now inextricably intertwined with the terrorist attacks in our region, is intimately familiar with the responsibility, challenges, and repercussions of security and counter-terrorism.
The Port Authority also manages the largest port on the East Coast and the 15th largest port in the world, The Port of New York and New Jersey. Despite increased security efforts since 9/11, the port remains a prime terrorist target because of the diverse origins and sheer numbers of containers that move through it, the location of the port in a dense metropolitan region, the importance of the port to the region and nation's economy, and the crippling effect that a port shutdown would have on the economy. Moreover, terrorists may use containers to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or bomb making materials into the United States, since it is next to impossible to screen and search every container that enters the port.
The challenge of screening the millions of containers that enter the port each year again raises the question of strategy and where to direct limited resources. While marine port security has received only 13% of the Homeland Security grants that have been provided to commercial aviation security, even dramatically increased funding levels might not be sufficient to screen every container. To lower the risk presented by unscreened containers, Anthony Coscia, Chairman of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey argued in a recent Star Ledger editorial that increased authentication and cooperation with foreign governments along the length of the cargo supply chain may be a more effective strategy. This systematic approach would begin with authentication and inspection of a container at its loading point, certification of every handler along the way, and coordination of standards between all parties involved.
At the Local Level: Perimeter Security and Urban Design
Personal vigilance and protection of city streets, civic plazas and places of business are of utmost importance and infinitely challenging. One component of this challenge is securing the perimeters of high risk buildings from car or truck bombs. Measures to protect places like the Stock Exchange in Lower Manhattan and the Capitol and major monuments in Washington, D.C. were implemented shortly after 9/11 and have been in place at embassies across the world since the 1998 Al Qaeda bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These barricades usually take the form of unsightly concrete "Jersey barriers," guard posts, parked trucks, weighted barrels and metal fencing that degrade the quality of public spaces and promote a mood of fear and defensiveness.
Washington, D.C., which faces many of the same problems as New York City in securing the perimeters of sensitive buildings, has been guided by a comprehensive urban design strategy for perimeter security of federal buildings called the National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan. Completed in October 2002 and coordinated by the National Capital Planning Commission, the plan promotes an arsenal of attractive landscaping elements and street furniture such as trees, decorative fences, bollards, planters and hardened street furniture to serve the role that temporary Jersey barriers and terminally parked trucks currently play in New York. This type of strategy is befitting to the long-haul nature of the nation's security challenge.
The recognition that the threat of terrorism is here to stay is an important concept to guide counter-terrorism strategy at every level. From the federal formulas that distribute homeland security dollars to states, to the infinite challenge of monitoring containers at marine ports, to the chaos of securing public spaces and crowded city streets, a strategy must focus at some level on reasonable threats and risks. The three examples provided above illustrate how the vastness of the threat can be focused to provide security with extra benefits, such as a more coordinated and secure supply chain for international shipping, and more beautiful and secure public spaces.
This essay is the last in a series of background pieces prepared for the 15th Annual Regional Assembly, to be held on Friday, April 29 at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City. The Assembly, "Beyond Red and Blue: The Tri-State Region in a Changing National Context," will focus on the Tri-State Region's relationship with the nation in the wake of the 2004 presidential elections. To register for the event click or to see a full program, visit: http://www.rpa.org.
The subject of counter-terrorism and security is so broad and so challenging that it overwhelms both the funding available and the scope of imagination to conceive of and try to prevent every possible attack. There are three areas, however, that have received attention in the New York Region for their shortcomings or vulnerabilities in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11: how federal funding is allocated to high risk areas like the New York Region; how to secure marine ports - particularly the Port of New York and New Jersey; and how to secure public spaces and city streets.
Though these three subjects comprise both policy and place-based strategies, the common theme is the immensity of the need or risk, and the limited supply or scope of resources to satisfy the need or counter the threat. Thus, federal policy makers and local leaders are required to make choices about where to allocate resources. The choices that are made define our current counter-terrorism and security strategy.
At the National Level: Funding Formulas
In his first public address last month at George Washington University, new Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff offered a peek into the department's thinking about where to focus the nation's limited resources. Chertoff signaled that he will employ a risk-based approach and measured strategy, recognizing that the war against terrorism "is a marathon, not a sprint," and must be integrated into our daily lives. His challenge will be to guide an agency that was created in response to the 9/11 attacks to one that can function over many years, separating catastrophic threats from minor ones and providing guidance to the American public on where to focus their vigilance.
National policy is already moving in this direction. After 9/11, Congress dramatically increased spending on grants to state and local governments for "first responder" programs that prepared fire fighters, police and emergency workers with training and equipment. Almost half of these initial grants were distributed evenly across the nation, however, with little attention paid to level of risk. Each state received .75% of the total amount of homeland security grants as a starting point. As a result, states like Montana and Alaska received the greatest funding per capita and states like New York and California received the least. These formulas were rightly criticized for wasting limited dollars protecting rural towns with low risk, while leaving New York City to spend its own funding on increased security and counter-terrorism efforts. In the federal budget for Fiscal Year 2006 the formulas have been changed, reducing the minimum distribution to each state from .75% of total grants to .25%. Additional grants will be awarded on the basis of risk, benefiting larger cities like New York City, and conforming with Chertoff's risk-based philosophy.
At the Regional Level : Marine Ports:
Public agencies of the region like the Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey have the responsibility of protecting the region's airports, marine ports, bridges, tunnels, commuter trains, subway lines and stations. These agencies are eligible for supplemental grants through the states from the Department of Homeland Security and they rely on federal directives for policy guidance. Yet the agencies also have a degree of autonomy to create their own strategies. The Port Authority, whose history is now inextricably intertwined with the terrorist attacks in our region, is intimately familiar with the responsibility, challenges, and repercussions of security and counter-terrorism.
The Port Authority also manages the largest port on the East Coast and the 15th largest port in the world, The Port of New York and New Jersey. Despite increased security efforts since 9/11, the port remains a prime terrorist target because of the diverse origins and sheer numbers of containers that move through it, the location of the port in a dense metropolitan region, the importance of the port to the region and nation's economy, and the crippling effect that a port shutdown would have on the economy. Moreover, terrorists may use containers to smuggle weapons of mass destruction or bomb making materials into the United States, since it is next to impossible to screen and search every container that enters the port.
The challenge of screening the millions of containers that enter the port each year again raises the question of strategy and where to direct limited resources. While marine port security has received only 13% of the Homeland Security grants that have been provided to commercial aviation security, even dramatically increased funding levels might not be sufficient to screen every container. To lower the risk presented by unscreened containers, Anthony Coscia, Chairman of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey argued in a recent Star Ledger editorial that increased authentication and cooperation with foreign governments along the length of the cargo supply chain may be a more effective strategy. This systematic approach would begin with authentication and inspection of a container at its loading point, certification of every handler along the way, and coordination of standards between all parties involved.
At the Local Level: Perimeter Security and Urban Design
Personal vigilance and protection of city streets, civic plazas and places of business are of utmost importance and infinitely challenging. One component of this challenge is securing the perimeters of high risk buildings from car or truck bombs. Measures to protect places like the Stock Exchange in Lower Manhattan and the Capitol and major monuments in Washington, D.C. were implemented shortly after 9/11 and have been in place at embassies across the world since the 1998 Al Qaeda bombings of American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These barricades usually take the form of unsightly concrete "Jersey barriers," guard posts, parked trucks, weighted barrels and metal fencing that degrade the quality of public spaces and promote a mood of fear and defensiveness.
Washington, D.C., which faces many of the same problems as New York City in securing the perimeters of sensitive buildings, has been guided by a comprehensive urban design strategy for perimeter security of federal buildings called the National Capital Urban Design and Security Plan. Completed in October 2002 and coordinated by the National Capital Planning Commission, the plan promotes an arsenal of attractive landscaping elements and street furniture such as trees, decorative fences, bollards, planters and hardened street furniture to serve the role that temporary Jersey barriers and terminally parked trucks currently play in New York. This type of strategy is befitting to the long-haul nature of the nation's security challenge.
The recognition that the threat of terrorism is here to stay is an important concept to guide counter-terrorism strategy at every level. From the federal formulas that distribute homeland security dollars to states, to the infinite challenge of monitoring containers at marine ports, to the chaos of securing public spaces and crowded city streets, a strategy must focus at some level on reasonable threats and risks. The three examples provided above illustrate how the vastness of the threat can be focused to provide security with extra benefits, such as a more coordinated and secure supply chain for international shipping, and more beautiful and secure public spaces.
@RegionalPlan